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MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AS A CRIMINAL OFFENCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL

LAw THEORY AND

PRACTICE

- Kuna! Arnbasta

INTRODUCTION
The question of criminalization of negligence, particularly as it concerns the
acts of medical professionals, represents a grey area of law which lies between
civil and criminal law.' The focus of this paper is on the distinguishing features
between these two forms ofliability. The broad arguments which will be raised
in the paper can be categorized as striving to answer the debate on whether this
conduct should be criminalized at all, and if so, what should be the standards
for such sanction. The question of criminalization of medical negligence is
one which several jurisdictions are attempting to answer and have answered
through case-law in varying and unclear ways. It is important to understand
the varying approaches taken by courts in different jurisdictions to this issue
and the policy implications these decisions have.
The present paper will undertake an analysis of criminal negligence as an area
oflaw. The paper attem pts to study the theoretical aspects alld concerns which
relate to the criminalization of negligent conduct. Cases which simultaneously
relate to the law of crimes and this area of negligence most often fo llow the fact
pattern where death has been caused. As a result, mOSt of the case law which
will be utilized in the present paper should allude to similar facts.
Our first concern in the paper is to locate and study the position of negligence
in the criminal law framework. The offence occupies a special and problematic

The paper is narrowed by focusing itS study on 'medical negligence' viz., negl igent conduct
of medical professionals in [he course of patient care.
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position herein, as has been noted in several academic debates. The present
paper will attempt to address the concerns which have been raised therein and
to evaluate whether the existence of an offence such as criminal negligence is
detrimental to a valid and coherent theory of criminal law. This relates both
to the causal requirements of committing a negligent act, such as the lack
of requirement for mens ret? and the difficulties which have been faced In
demarcating a level of carelessness which should be criminalized. 3
The second part of the paper undertakes a comparative analysis of criminal
negligence in twO jurisdictions: India and the United Kingdom. Noting the
lack of scholarly material on this aspect in India, the paper will also survey the
development of the law in these two jurisdictions. These jurisdictions belong
to the Common Law heritage, and the inceptions and initial application
of the law of negligence within them have been uniform. On the topic of
medical negligence under the Criminal Law, however, we see distinct threads
of development and, consequently, different conclusions which have been
reached. Though the arc of difference between the standards applied extends
only from that of gross negligence and recklessness, we shall see how the
different approaches taken have led to varying positions on sub-issues on
criminal negligence.
The paper will also be mindful of the vastly different natures of the medical
profession within these jurisdictions. We will move from a system which has
different standards of judicial scrutiny for government and private medical care
and which has seen immense judicial activism in this area oflaw, i.e. , India, to
the United Kingdom where the National Health Service has been unable to get
any concessions from the judiciary despite its claims of being an overstretched
and insufficiently manned service. Different realities in these jurisdictions
inspire varying policies, and it would be futile to compare systems without
understanding the needs of the country we are studying. Therefore, the same
should always be kept in mind.
2

The (erm 'mms rea' here is used in a technical sense. The discussion on (he topic will

3
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reveal how the requirement has been argued
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The present paper aims ro address both its portions with a normative analysis.
The questions which are presented by this area oflaw are complex and multiple.
Whether the coherence and moral sanction of the cri minal law can be preserved
with an ostensibly 'morally blind' offence such as that of negligence, whether
the standard of gross negligence or that of recklessness need be applied, and the
individual questions of what positions should evolve across jurisdictions need
ro be addressed. The paper will attempt ro do the same and, in the process,
address the nuanced issues of law which do arise in this area of law.

A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
The question of imposing criminal sanction for negligent behavior has been
one which has led to significant controversy in the law.' It IS dealt with by the
law of rom and contractual relations for the most part.' The possibility of penal
sanction is seen to arise most strongly in cases where the negligent conduct has
resulted in a loss oflife.
The penal form of negligence requires all of the conditions made under a civil
action, namely, that the duty to act or to not act be present, that the duty be
breached, and that the breach of duty results in harm. 6 What then must be the
distinction between penalizing such acts or omissions with criminal sanction
as opposed to civil liability? The answer, as indicated above, is partially found
in the result of such negligence, notably, the result is death. However, a part of
the answer has also been attempted at the degree of negligence that has been
exhibited, in whether the acrot exhibited negligence which was gross in nature,
or whether the conduct was explicitly reckless.7 There exist theoretical problems
with each of these arguments, and the same will be highligh ted as follows.
4

Jerome Hall, N<gligmt &havior Should b< Exclukd from Pmal Liability 63
REv. 632 (I 963).

5

Andrew Grubb, Dutits in Contract and Tort 322 in

CO LUM.

PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL

L.

LAw First

Edition Oxford University Press (2004 ).

6

These are [h~ conditions to be met i~ order to. estab~is~ a ~e of negli.gencc; the ingredicms
ofgross ~egltgence and reckJessness, Irrespective ofJunsdlCtion. requ ire at a bare minimum
~at neglIgence ~US{ have occurred. Gross negligence or reckJ essness may be seen as special

7

This will become apparent in the ensuing discussion .

Instances of negligence.
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The problem of associating penal sanction with an act merely because of the
result which it produces is a dangerous substitute to the requirement of a
mental state of intent in order to convict. The second argument also brings us
back to the same position, as what the argument has tried to do is substitute
the level of deviance from the norm as a sufficient marker of culpabiliry. It also
disregards the requirement of mens rea in the technical sense.'
Professor H . L.A. Hart has argued that the criminalization of negligence is
not problematic per se, as the required mental state need not be expressed
through a positive act as has been suggested by some other scholars. According
to Professor Hart, the required mem rea is in the actor's failure to remain in a
position where he would not commit negligence. Therefore, the mental state
is in failing to maintain a careful and non-negligent mental capaciry.' Professor
Hart also considers an additional rationale for negligence culpabiliry, namely,
the encouragement of more careful behavior. lO
The arguments against the criminalization of negligence are that the offence
does not require a mental state akin to what is ordinarily criminalized, which
can be roughly defined as a specific intention to bring about a particular
result. lI Larry Alexander has argued that the cri minalization of negligence
seeks to reintroduce concepts of strict liabiliry into the criminal law. I' The
American jurist, Jerome Hall argued that there was no justification for criminally
punishing a negligent actor as per the provisions of the Model Penal Code. 13 He
stated that the offence of negligence requires neither a subjectively indifferent
state of mind, nor a conscious attempt to bring about the harm, and, therefore,
it should be excluded from criminalliabiliry. 14
8

Mms rta here refers to the failure (0 perceive an apparent risk; this is different from the
memal intent

9

{Q

bring about a result which is seen in the case of most crimes.

H.L.A. Han, NrgligmC(, Mms Rra and Criminal Rtsponsibiiity 136 in
REsPONSIBILITY: EsSAYS IN THE PHIl.OSOPHY OF

PUNISHM ENT AND

LAwOxford Uni versity Press (1968).

10

Id.

11

ANDREW AsHWORTH , PRl NCIPLES OF C RlMINAL LAw(l991 ).

12

Larry Alexander, Reconsitkring thr Rtlationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability. and
Crimina/Law 84, 85 in CRIME, CULPABILITY AND REMEDy(l995).

13

Supra nme 4.
Id.

14
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The academic debate which has continued between scholars has had little impact
on the courtS or penal provisions which extend the liability of negligent actors
to the criminal sphere. 15 The issue, as has been seen by most commentators
in this area of law is whether negligence liability punishes the actor for what
may be loosely referred to as a "mistake." However, as a discussio n on the
standards of negligence required for the imposition of criminal liability may
demonstrate, the debate must extend much further, because the notion that
mistakes are being punished can be dispelled when we see what the standard
of required negligence is.

The Standard of Negligent Conduct
The notion of criminally punishing reckless behavior is clearly established
in the criminal law. Recklessness requires a subjective srate of mind in the
knowledge that a grave or subsrantial risk persists and the conscious decision
of the actor to run the risk. The offence is committed once e risk comes to
pass and the harm is done. A common example is the driving of a vehicle in
an inebriated srate and causing the death of another person. Recklessness thus
requires a subjective srate of mind to be established. Knowle ge has been held
to be a lesser satisfier of the mens rea requirement in Criminal Law. T he idea
of imposing criminal liability for reckless conduct is generally accepted. 16
Negligence 'simpliciter: on the other hand, requires nothing which pertains
to the srate of the actor's mind. The requirements are simple, that there exists
a duty of care between the parties, that the duty be breached, and an inj uty or
harm results from the breach. 17 There is no mental state required. An inadvertent
omission or act would suffice to constitute liability in this case. Liability for
negligence is extended only to civil remedies generally. It is also clear that the
15

Alexander McCall Smith, Criminal or Mm/y Human?: Thr Proucution ofNrgligmt Doctors
12). CONTEMr. HI!Al.TH L. &POL'yI32 (1995).

16

Heidi A. Barcus and Eric Shen, Facing l'roucution and Prison, Whm Do£! Mrdical Negligent<
brcomr Criminal 52(7) DR! For Oef. 36 (2010).
For a discussion on [he moral blame of negligence. Sf( ALAN MERRY, A l.EXAN DER McCALL

17

S MITH , ERRORS, MEDICINE AND THE

HOMICIDE 163 (1997).

LAwl27 (200 1). Also see,

STAN LEY YEO. FAULT IN
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liability be kept limited to its civil nature in the case of such ingredients, none
of which require a mental state.
The ultimate question, therefore, is whether a certain form of negligence may
require a mental state in order to constitute a criminal offence or if recourse
may only be taken to penal sanction where the standard of recklessness is
mer. This is the quandary that several jurisdictions within the Common Law
system are currently dealing with and trying to answer. " The second part of
this paper will attempt to summarize and evaluate two such jurisdictions which
have adopted different standards on imposing penal sanctions for negligence.
The answer to the question has been further complicated by what difference
must remain between recklessness and gross negligence. We know that reckless
conduct involves a subjective mental state, namely that of knowledge and
indifference to the risk which is about to be run and is known of. 19 Where
should we locate gtoss negligence if this is something that has to exist as a
different standard? We must also address the following question: what is the
need for the 'gross negligence' standard if there already exists a ' reckless' one?
Remembering that the reckless standard requires a mental state of appreciation
of a grave risk: if a doctor who is about to undertake a procedure upon a
patient, which can be held to be extremely risky, considering his skill or known
medical standards, and he has the knowledge of such a risk. Two situations may
follow; the first that the doctor runs the risk with indifference to the safety of
the patient, and the act proves fatal to the patient. This fits the definition of
reckless behavior, and the doctor would be held criminally liable. Let us now
come to the second situation; the doctor appreciates the risk involved and acts
to avoid such risk. However, his method of avoiding the risk is grossly negligent.
He, thereby, causes the death of his patient. This course of action would not

18

The answer offered has also varied from one jurisdiction to anmher, with the United
Kingdom setding for a grossly negligent standard and India coming to one of recklessness.
The position varies from one state to another in the United States, but the Model Penal
Code has agreed on a gross negligence standard.

19 Supra nOlel 6.
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amount CO recklessness since the anticipated risk was not fUn.'o It is a different
question, however, whether the action is morally culpable r not.
The question of having a separate standard for gross negligence culpability is
generally answered with the help of arguments which are based on the abovementioned hypothetical case: that there is something which may be attributed
to an extremely callous instance of conduct by a medical professional or that
there must be a mental state of omission which can be punished. The difficulty
lies in the definition of what this "extremely callous" nature must be. It lies in
what level of deviation from the standard course of conduct m ust be sufficient
to hold that this must have been conducted with a state of mind which clearly
lacked consideration for the results of the action and was an example of
indifference co human life.
THE lACK OF CLARITY IN GROSS NEGLIGENCE
In criminal law, a special consideration must be given to whether the standards
set by the law are objective or not. This is essential because only objective
and transparent standards make it possible for citizens to arrange their affairs
accordingly." Definition of criminal negligence and the underlying standards,
having largely been developed by courts, lack both the features.
After all, what must be the standard of negligence? The judicial opinion on this
point has been vague and unhelpful at best. They speak of a "wan.con disregard""
20

21

Indeed, [he medical practitioner sought to avoid the perceived risk. The problem lies in
the manner in which he tried [0 avoid it, by conducting himself in a manner which was
negligent.
Brian H. Bix, Natural Law:

Th~ Motkrn

Tradition, 79-80 in the OXFORD

HANDBOOK OF

JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (Ed. Jules Coleman, Scott Shapiro, 2002).
22

Jonathan H erring, Elaine Palser, Th, Duty of Carr in Gro" N'gligrnc, Manslaughtrr.
CRIM.L.R.24 (2007). Further, the law in the United Kingdom has developed to the
extem where, what is to be decided is nO[ whether the conduct was grossly negl igem and
additionally a crime, but rather whether the conduct was grossly negligem and. therefore.
a ~rime. Culpability, therefore, becomes a maHer of fact for the jury. See, R. v. Misra&
Snvastava, [2005J 1 Cr. App. R. 21. Also see, Arunava Mukherjee, Abir Roy, Criminal
Liability of N'glig,nr Doctorr 32(3&4) Indian Bar Review 533 (2005) . Also see, Clare
Barsby, rt ai, Mans/"ughtrr: Manslaughtrr through Gro" N'gligenc, - Wh, thrr SujJici,nr
Certainty as to /ngr,dients of Offene, Crim. L.R. 234 (2005) .
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for human life. It does not take long to see precisely how open-textured this
and several other phrases are. In the United States, the Model Penal Code is
unhelpful as well , as it takes away the 'mental state of knowledge' completely
from the provision which would have made it possible to distinguish between
recklessness and gross negligence" It is not required to prove that the conduct
was reckless to establish an offence of negligent homicide.24
An unclear definition of a criminal offence is in itself the source ofa problem,
but even the requirement of mem rea in the case of negligent homicide is

complicated, as it is not the conventional understanding of'malice', but a failure
to perceive a risk." The question which must be answered now is whether the
failure to perceive a risk is a sufficient mental element to constitute the offence
into a crime. We are not dealing here with recklessness which would require
that the risk be perceived. The essence of the distinction is that that perception
is laclcing in the case of gross negligence.
The primary difficulry which is being grappled with is that negligence in a
criminal form represents to us a stark similariry to strict liabiliry which is based
on the mere act of the accused. However, a different enquiry and method of
determining culpability has been suggested by Professor H.L.A. Hart. He
states that the essential question is whether, in judging the conduct as morally
culpable, the accused is being held against a standard which is uniform, or
whether consideration is made to his individual circumstances and capaciry
and then his conduct proves that, given his capacities, he was morally culpable
in not talcing certain precautions. 26
Hart further states that,
'''Absolute liability' results, not from the admission of the principle
that one who has been grossly negligent is criminally responsible for
the comequent harm even if 'he had no idea in his mind of harm
23
24

S. 136, 40 C) .S. Homicide.
Kil e v. State. 382 A.2d 243 (Del. 1978)

25
26

Supra notel6.
Supra note9 at 154.
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to anyone,' but from the refosal in the application of this principle
to consider the capacities of an individual who has follen below the
standard ofcare. ' Q7
Secondly, the requirement that harm be contemplated by the actor at the time
of commission is not to be met, because what we are trying to establish in this
case is negligence, and not inadvertence. The confusion in this area oflaw has
also been caused because of the interchangeable way in which negligence and
mistake/inadvertence have been used. However, there is a distinction between
the two. Inadvertence may refer to the absence of any mental element and,
also, a standard of caution which may be prescribed to.28 On the other hand,
the term negligence carries the latter element with it."
The existence of inadvertence, if combined with a diminished mental capacity,
should only be considered a defence to this form of liability and not the
definition of negligence. The example that Professor Hart offers here is that
of handling a loaded gun, which requires a certain amount of caution and
advertence/attention. If, through negligence, we do not examine the situation
and inadvertently cause a loss oflife, the negligence is not in shooting someone
with a blank state of mind, but in the failure to appreciate the risk involved.'o
T he question of judging how far negligence goes is also made simpler by the
above mentioned formulation. If negligence is in the failure to appreciate risks
involved, gross negligence must entail this failure to a higher extent. Put in
different words, it may be something which is foreseeable even to someone with
diminished mental capacities, such as a child, and if the actor is so negligent
as to not even perceive that risk, it must be adjudged gross."

This leaves us in an unenviable position if we consider some of the decisions
which have emanated from the United States, holding that the particular
27

[d.

28

Sup ra note 9 at 147-148.

29

!d.

30

[d.

31

Supra note 9, at 149.
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characteristics of an individual, such as experience, intelligence, etc. , would be
inconsequential , as the standard to be applied is mat of a reasonably prudent
person. 32 The positions taken by several jurisdictions make it difficult to justifY
criminal liability for negligence on me argumenrs raised by Professor Hart, as a
primaty component of his defense for me existence of criminal negligence was
that individualized circumstances must always be part of the considerations
when me action was being evaluated.
Even if Professor Hart has valiantly argued the case for criminal negligence,
we must understand that what survives after this is a highly individualized
basis for imposing liability on the accused. Perhaps this may also explain why
the law of criminal negligence does not enjoy me stability and predictability
generally associated with me penal law." Indeed, as we shall see, it has vety
recently survived a challenge to me European Court of Human Righrs on me
grounds that me basis for criminal liability in me case of criminal negligence
is "circular" and, therefore, in violation of the EU Charter.'"

Policy Considerations in the Criminalization of Gross Negligence
The criminalization of negligence by medical professionals and me growing
number of cases in criminal court is a topic which raises several policy
considerations. The medical profession is a self-governing and autonomous
one, where professionals are required to act in meir best judgment, often under
situations of great mental stress and technical specialization. 35 To hold this
standard ro scrutiny, it is argued, would place judges and juries in a position
where they would be required to consider highly specialized science and irs
application wimout having any such knowledge.36 It has been suggested mat

32

Edgmon v. State 702 P.2d 643 (Alaska Cc App. 1985) .

33

R. V. Misra and Srivastava [2004] EWCA Crim 2375.

34 !d.
35

Added to this is the significant shortage of manpower in paramed ical and nursing roles,
which make the commission of mistakes more likely. Supra 16.

36

lames A. Filkins, With No Evillnunt: The Criminal Proucution ofPhysicians for Medical
Negligmu22J. LEGALMED.491 (200 1).
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in the jurisdictions which continue to use them, juries often substitute their
own judgment of how a patient should be treated and whether the professional
displayed genuine concern for the patient, rather than the standard of deviation
from his own capabilities."
It has been argued that the criminal prosecution of doctors cannot serve a

positive function. It cannot be a deterrent, as there is no clear intent to cause
harm to the patient. Professor Hoffman suggests that the act of prosecution may
also create a "counter-deterrent" with medical professionals grouping together
and viewing prosecutions as illegitimate. 38
Finally, there are other mechanisms to ensure a high standard of medical care
and to make negligence less common in medical care. Punishments imposed
by state medical and nursing boards such as suspension, revocation ofi icenses,
etc., along with civil liability would be sufficient to deter me ical profess ionals
from wantonly causing mishaps and would ensure justice."
The first argument that the criminalization of negligence cannot have any
effect on the potential behavior of medical professionals in the futu re suffers
from twO fallacies, in my opinion. First of ali , it is the same error of equating
negligence with inadvertence and "mistake" that we have considered in this
paper earlier. It does not take into account that negligence, being different from
an inadvertent act in terms of the specific mental state and consideration of
the capacities of the individual is not merely a mistake. Secondly, the fact that
a criminal punishment may not serve a useful deterrent exists for every crime.
The deterrent theory of punishment continues to be applied, but there exists
no specific agreeable proof that it is a successful endeavor. Professor Hart says

37 Jam es A. Filkins, Criminalization o[Medical Negligme<507-508 in LeGAL M EDICINE (7"
cd., 2007).

L.J. 1049,

38

Diane E. Hoffmann , Physicians Who Break the Law 53 ST. loUIs U.
(2009 ).

39

Prmecting the Public: How State .Medical .Boards Regulat~ and Discipline Physicians,
http:// www.fsmb.orglsmb_protectIng..pubhc. html. and NatIonal CounCIl ofSra« Boards
of Nursing, hnps:llwww. ncsbn.org/ 163.htm. Cited in supra16.
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so in his response to Professor Turner as well." Furthermore, the argument that
it may not affect future behavior again presupposes that the mental element is
as laclcing in cases of gross negligence as it is in inadvertently doing something.
The fact that juries have been found wanting in their ability to distinguish
the elements of negligence and have been guided by extraneous factors is,
also, not an attack on the nature of the liability or its legal soundness within
the framework of the criminal law, but on the administration of a sound legal
principle in a faulty way. Indeed, for a large part of the Twentieth Century,
juries in the United States, and especially in the Southern states, used rape cases
to carry out thinly veiled lynching of Black defendants; however, that was not
an attack on the nature of the crimes they were being charged with, bur the
way the judicial system had been mutated against them."
Criminal medical negligence is also dismissed on the basis that its goals can
be satisfied by civil liability plus professional censure of the defendants if
their negligence is established. However, the criminal penal provision against
involuntary manslaughter has deeper roots and a greater scope than being
applied just against medical professionals. One could argue in a si milar vein
that monetary compensation and the permanent revocation of the driver's
license of a person who drives in an inebriated state and lcills a pedestrian
should suffice to ensure justice. Ultimately, the decision to punish or consider
as civil these twO cases is a policy one, and when the nature of criminal law
and the policy decision throughout the Common law realm has been to treat
it as a penal offence, the burden n:'ust be on those who oppose it to show
that medical professionals belong to a separate dass and, therefore, should be
treated differently.
The criminalization of gross negligence may be bad policy; it is not the purpose
of this paper at this point, to say that the policies in this respect are to be
accepted. However, it cannot be said that the criminalization of gross negligence

40
41

Supra

nOte

9 at 149.

MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL(I973).
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is inconsistent with the criminal law and its basic functio s. Ai; we have seen,
there does exist a mental element to constitute the offence, there does exist a
degree of individualization in determining liability, and th e consideration of
mitigating factors such as high stress and shortages of resources may, of course,
be done at the stage of sentencing.
The next part of this paper will undertake the analysis of the law of criminal
medical negl igence as it exists in two jurisdictions: India and the United
Kingdom . At this stage, we will consider whether the standards of conduct
and the policy behind the law taken in each jurisdiction fi ts well into the
jurisprudence of negligence liability and whether it is good policy.

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Development of the Law

The development of the law of criminal negligence in the United Kingdom
has a substantial history of decisions and legislative and policy action . The
primary question which courts in that jurisdiction have wrestled with is where
to draw the line between gross negligence and recklessness. The courts seemed
ro have struggled with evolving a standard which would ta e into account the
realities of ctiminalizing negligence without resorting to subjective tecklessness.
These attempts have scoped in different directions, with e Caldwell" court
taking a novel position which has since been abandoned , specifical ly in 1995.
The court in Caldwell attempted to create a new form of recklessness liability
which would encompass both the subjective as well as the objective standard
of punishing the offence. We will discuss the historical development of the law
in order once the Caldwell case is described.
The decision involved a case where a disgruntled hotel employee, who was
removed ftom service, decided, in a drunken state, to set fi re to his employer's
hotel. Unknown to him at this time, the hotel was occupied by ten guests who
were asleep. No persons were harmed, but the defendant was charged not just
42

[1982] A. C. 341.
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with arson (a charge to which he pleaded guilty), but also with arson with
the intent to endanger human life, which could be satisfied with recklessness.
In essence, what the decision in Caldwell did was to create two prongs of
recklessness, one where the risk is foreseen and a decision taken to run it and,
second, when no thought is given to the risk at all. 43 This position, articulated
by the court, has come in for severe criticism as introducing a dichotomy in
legal theory which was irreconcilable." The subjective recklessness liability
cannot be reconciled with an objective standard which does not require the
harm to be foreseen at all.
Recklessness as a state of mind which can be culpable needs the element of
knowledge. The decision of the court in Caldwell was not unanimous, and
Lord Edmund-Davies had specifically argued in his dissenting opinion that
the majority opinion ignored the legislative intent behind the statute, viz., the
Criminal Damage Act, 1971 " TheAct was designed by the Law Comm ission,
which had defined recklessness in its subjective form only. The decision
effectively changed the substance of the law of recklessness in its subjective
form. It is widely regarded that the majority went beyond the accepted rules
of statutory interpretation when he decided the case: ·
Further, Alan Norrie argues that the test in Caldwell effectively made it easier
to convict an accused, as it no longer required the jury to consider matters of
actual foresight in a recklessness caseY It simply asks the jury to decide whether
a reasonable person would have been able to foresee the harm which could be
caused. The main reason why the subjective form of the test in recklessness has
met with objections from judges is that they have been apprehensive that the
43

Id.

44

A.u..N N ORRIE, CRIME, REAsON AND HISTORY:

A CRlTI CAL INTRODUCTION TO C RIMINAL

LAw 63 (200 1).

45

197 1 c. 48.

46

A.T.H . Smith, "Law Reform Proposals and the Courts" in I. Dennis Criminal Law and
Juscice( 1987) . The autho r states, 'It seems

[Q

me that . in redefining the limits of criminal

liabiliry in this way. his speech borders on [he unconstitutionaL Parliament, advised by [he
Law Commissio n, had chosen the point at which it thought that liability should attach,"

47

Supra note 45 at 6 1.
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jury would acquit too readily. The objective test, in contrast, allows the jury
to express its indignation at the defendant's conduct without having to verifY
what the accused person's mental state was."
The test in Caldwell came to represent a great problem before the court in the
case of R. v. Seymour. 49 The defendant in that case had a hea ted argu men t with
his girlfriend and then attempted to crush her car with his lorry. Unfortunately,
he did not realize that she was in the car and was being crushed. The elements of
recklessness as laid out in the former resulted in the same elements existing for
motor vehicle manslaughter and "reckless manslaughter, crimes which attracted
completely different sentences of imprisonment upon conviction . .
In the particular case, the ptosecution was entrusted with the responsibility
of determining which charge it would bring on the facts of the case, and the
jury was not to hesitate to acquit the accused if it found that the degree of
'turpirude' exhibited by the evidence was not sufficient to convict for the charge
btought. This reliance on adjudging a concept such as 'turpitude,' without a
distinction being made in law, has been criticized as vague and unclear.' OIe
was also believed that since Seymour had re-applied the test of recklessness
to manslaughter, and now both the objective and the subjective pto ngs were
included within its definition, there would be no need for t e gross negligence
standard which had existed in the United Kingdom. 51

R. v. Bateman had held that there would be cases where negligence would be
a matter requiring criminal sanction. 52 The case involved death of a woman
during childbirth. However, the decision had not attributed anything to whether
the accused displayed a knowledge or foresight of the risk. Instead, it held,
".. . that the negligence or incompetence ofthe accused went beyond a mere matter
ofcompensation and showed such disregard for the lift and sarety of others as to
48
49
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amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment. ' 53 Thus,
the test in this case was of what the degree of carelessness exhibited was. The
decision did not provide the jury any guidance as to what they must consider
to be criminal negligence or what the degree of negligence had to faU below in
order to be considered civil negligence. We see that the ptoblems of the dividing
line between civil and criminalliabiliry were exhibited here.
Gross negligence, as applied by Bateman, had a long history' in negligence
cases, where jury directions were given and verdicts reached on the degree of
disapproval that the case evoked in the mind of the judge and the jury. There
were instances where the same facts led to disparate results and completely
incoherent precedent. 54
To cite a few examples, in R. v. Williamson 55 decided in 1807, the defendant
was a man who practiced as an accoucheur (midwife) and while delivering a
baby tore away a part of the uterus of the woman whose child he was delivering,
causing her death. The defendant was not a 'regularly trained' midwife and
usually was employed by the lower economic strata of people for his services.
In the charge of manslaughter, the court summed up the instruction to the jury
and characterized the acts of the defendant as a panicked response to a situation
of great danger. The court further observed that a finding of guilr would, "...
tend to encompass a most important and anxious proftssion with such dAngers as
would deter reflecting men from entering it. '56 The defendant was acquitted in the
case. Compare this decision of the court with the one in R. v. Spille,sl where it
was held that any man who professed to practice the business of medicine and
life and death would be bound to have the professional and competent skill to
perform the task that he purportS to perform, and if a patient died under his
care for want of sufficient attention, he should be convicted.
53

Id.

54

The number of cases with disparate results which was announced in the 19 th century is
very large. The following is only a representative number.
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There was no coherence in the law of criminal negligence in that time; it was a
question of degree, which was usually left to the degree by which the jury felt
violated or perturbed with the facts at bar. This was not solved by the Court's
apptoach in Bateman which did not provide a set standard for the jury in a
criminal negligence case. 58 This was followed by the decision of Andrews v.
Director ofPublic Prosecution;9 which gave approval to the gross negligence test
and, also, stated that recklessness would be the most useful underlying criterion
to be applied by trial judges. This was the beginning of the conflation between
gross negligence and recklessness.
The confusion was not resolved by the House of Lords in the decision of R.
v.Lawrence'i" where the Court extended the Caldwell test to motor vehicle
manslaughter. The defendant, while riding his motorcycle, ran into and killed a
pedestrian. He was charged with causing death by reckless driVIng. The defendant
was driving at a speed of about 60 to 80 mph in a 30 mph area. The jury was
directed that a person drove recklessly when he deliberately disregarded his
obligation of care or was indifferent to whether he did so and, thereby, created a
risk which would not have been created ifhe had taken due care. The defendant
was convicted, and the Court of Appeals quashed the conviction. A question
was certified as to what the degree of mens rea was required for conviction, if any.
The Crown's appeal was quashed, and it was decided that the jury would have
to be satisfied that the defendant drove in such a manner as to create an obvious
and serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person, and that the
defendant had given no thought to the existence of the risk in his act or, even
ifhe had considered it, had gone ahead to take it, nonetheless .61
The decision in Lawrence was an example of proliferation of Caldwell logic to
motor vehicle cases, as well. Indeed, this application was specifically upheld a
year later in the decision of R. V. Seymour.62
58
59
60
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The Modern Law of Gross Negligence in the United Kingdom
The practice of the court to expand recklessness liability in criminal law to cover
the objective and the subjective prongs of the action had led to considerable
confusion. The effect had also been that the degree of separation between grossnegligence and negligence simpliciter remained ambiguous . The decision in
Caldwell itself had nor been unanimous, and the fact that it went against the
views of the Law Commission was noted in the dissenting opinion. At this time,
the judiciary in the United Kingdom was forced ro focus on certain complex
matters of law. Had the Caldwell definition of recklessness subsumed and,
therefore, rendered the charge of gross negligence redundant? Was recklessness
as a concept ever designed or meant to encompass both subjective and objective
prongs? These questions came ro the fore in the case of Regina v. Adomako. 63 The
case involved an eye surgery, during which paralytic and anesthetic medicines
were to be administered. The patient was put on artificial respiration during
the operation, and the pipe carrying oxygen to him got disconnecred. The
defendant rook an unduly long time in realizing that the supply had stopped,
and the patient died as a result.
The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the House of Lords on the specific
question which we have been discussing in the foregoing section, namely,

"...in cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence not involving
driving, but involving a breach ofduty. is it a sufficient direction to
the jury to adopt the gross negligence test set out by the Court ofAppeal
in the present case following Bateman . .. and Andrews. .. without
reference to the test ofrecklessness as defined in Lawrence (Stephen) ...
or as adapted to the circumstances ofthe case"'"
The defendants made succinct and hard-hitting arguments towards the lack of
clarity and the ambiguity of the legal position in such cases.

In particular, the defendant argued that the law of involuntary manslaughter
should have the characteristics of clarity, consistency, intellectual coherence and
63
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general applicability65 They then argued that the modern law of involuntaty
manslaughter had created uncertainty as to which test should be applied and
whether gross negligence should be used as a substantive test at all. T he defendant
highlighted the problems and vacying approaches taken by prosecutors in different
cases ofinvoluntaty manslaughter and asked for a uniform approach. T he defence
fully exploited the way in which gross negligence had bee applied, with the
jury often focusing on the outcome of the negligent act to infer the degree of
negligence exhibited. In particular, the defence counsel,

"criticized the concept ofgross negligence which was the basis of the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, submitting that its flrmu lotion
involved circularity, the jury being told in effict to convict ofa crime if
they thought a crime had been committed and that, accordingly, using
gross negligence as the conceptual basis for the crime of involuntary
manslaughter was unsatisfactory, and the court should apply the
law laid down in Seymour ... generally to all cases of involuntary
manslaughter or, at least, use this as the basis for providing general
applicability and acceptability. '66
Finally, the defence developed its argument that the test of gtoss negligence
would be better replaced by that of recklessness in cases of criminal negligence.
The definition of gross negligence was argued to be circular, with the jury being
asked to convict of a crime if they thought that a crime had been committed. 6'
It argued that the invitation to convict the defendant on the basis of an unclear
and ambiguous test was unjust and not required if the test of recklessness would
be followed as laid down in CaldwelL68 That definition, geared toward covering a
specific "commission," would clearly prove inadequate in the present case which
involved omission by the defendant and, therefore, must lead to an acquittal.
Lord Mackay delivered the opinion of the court by holding that he agreed with
the argument of circularity in the test of gross negligence. He stated that the
area oflaw being such where the degree of departure from the level of conduct
had to be measured, the issue of degree could not be done away with and an
65
66
67
68
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attempt to define that degree more closely would only be an attempt to achieve
a "sp urious precision. "69

The Court then held that the decision in Srymourwould no longer be considered
good law, as the underlying law of the decision had been replaced by newer
legislation. Finally, it turned to criticism which had been leveled against the
summation given by the judge at the lower level, a summation which had finally
instructed the jury to, "only convict a doctor of causing a death by negligence if

you think he did something which no reasonably skilled doctor should have done. "10
This would be an apptopriate time to recapitulate the discussion which was
undertaken in the first part of the paper, where it was seen that gross negligence
as a criminal offence would only be justifiable if the standard of conduct was
not taken as an objective one, but one which took into account the capabilities
and circumstances of the individual. This was the argument in the present case:
that the summation given had ignored that individualization requirement.
The Court held the statement to be a condition which would necessitate the
acquittal of the defendant unless it was satisfied, and not an invitation to convict the
defendant ifsatisfied. Thus, he held that the summation was properly administered,
and the challenge devoid of any merit. On the question oflaw referred, he answered,

"'In cases ofmanslaughter by criminal negligence involving a breach of
duty. it is a sufficient direction to the jury to adopt the gross negligence
test set out by the Court of Appeal in the present case following
Bateman, . .. andAndrews ... and that it is not necessary to refer to the
definition of recklessness in Lawrence . .. although it is perfectly open
to the trial judge to use the word 'reckless' in its ordinary meaning
as part ofhis exposition of the law if he deems it appropriate in the
circumstances ofthe particular case. "11
69
70
71

Supra nOte 64, at 187.
Supra nOte 64, at 188.
Supra note 64, at 188. The Coun: further explains, "The experienced counsel who assisted
your Lordships in this appeal indicated that, as a practical maner, there was a danper in
over-elaboration of definition of the word 'reckless,' While. therefore. I have said In my
view. it is perfectly open to a trial/'udge to use the word 'reckless' if it appears app ropriate
in the circumsta nces of a particu at case as indicating the extent to which a defendant's
conduct must deviate from that of a proper standard of care; I do not think it right to
require that (his should be done and certain ly not right (ha( it should incorporate the
full detail required in Lawrence."
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Challenges to the Rule after Adomako
Thus, the modern law of criminal negligence was effectively rid of the
requirement of technical recklessness which had been brought into it by the
decision in Lawrence. The rule in Adomako has been applied in the United
Kingdom since the decision was delivered. However, it did n t inspire an end
ro all problems when it was espoused. In 2005, two doctors were convicted of
gtoSS negligence manslaughter after a patient developed an i fecti ous wound
in post-operative care. The defendant doctors failed to diagnose the condition
despite obvious symptoms, and the patient died due to toxic shock. 72 The
defendants appealed their conviction, challenging the standard la id down in
the Adomako decision as being in violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights.
Article 7 (1) of the Convention provides that, "No-one shall be held guilty of
any criminal offince on account of any act or omission which did not constitute
a criminal offince under national or intemationallaw at the lime when it was
committed. nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable
at the time the criminal offince was committed" This has been interpreted to
imply that the law under which a person may be convicted has to be clearly
defined in the law and must be representative of the principle of certainty.?'
The Court dismissed the challenge to the Adomako test, holding that the
juty was not required to fin d whether the defendant's conduct was gross, and
whether, additionally, it would be a crime, but whether the conduct was gross
and consequently a crime. This was a question of fact and Ot law, and the
juty would be qualified to answer it. Though Lord Mackay had conceded that
there was circularity in the test, the level did not rise to an extent so as to be
repugnant under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

72
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[2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 328.
Brumarescu v. Romania, (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 35 at para.61 and Kokkinakis v. Greece,
(1993) 17 E.H .R.R. 397 at ' .52.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
The history of gross negligence manslaughter in the United Kingdom is both
rich in terms of the complexiry it has invoked as well as the solutions which
have been proposed to it. The rule in Adomako continues ro be valid law to date.
However, there have been problems which are associated with this standard
as well. First, the conceded element of circularity has led to some criticism of
the law as it presently stands." Second, the faCts in Adomako had involved an
omission which was adjudged to be criminal. The extension of criminal liability
to this aspect has been argued to have conflated principles of criminal law and
the law of tort which can be problematic in the future. "
Another interesting feature of the law in the United Kingdom is that the same
contours of liability have been extended over both private and governmentmanaged and run medical facilities. In R. v. Southampton University Hospital
NHS Trust/ 6 the court held that the same principles of liabiliry and the same
standards of care would be expected from the National Health Service as is done
for private players. This decision came despite the fact that government-funded
medical aid is pervasive in Britain and is the most common form of medical
aid available to citizens. Patients in the National Health System do not have
a contractual relationship with the doctors treating them, which they would
in a private faciliry. However, the same standards have been applied to both. n

It is a fact that the National Health Service operates under tremendous strain
in Britain, with the number of patients seeking aid far outstripping the facilities
which are available and, also, what is perceived to be a paucity of funds. In
this scenario, the extension of criminal liability for government doctors has
been criticized as an unnecessary burden on doctors who are operating under
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extraordinary pressure already.78 However, the legal standards and the law of
gross negligence have remained unaltered despite these criticisms. There is the
theoretical argument ro be made that the principles of criminal negligence must
not, in the interests of fairness, be different for different classes of people or
professionals, but rhat those factors must be considered on a case to case basis.
If we consider the tests for criminalliabiliry as applied in Adomakowith the
theoretical coherence of the criminal law which we had considered in the
first part of the paper, we would find that the tests evolved in the case are in
conformance with the requirement that the degree of deviance from the standard
of care be individualized; further, the decision effectively ends the unwieldy
definition and application of Caldwell recklessness and brings the law of gross
negligence in much greater clariry than what it was prior to it being announced.
There are twO remaining issues which we must consider at t is juncture, and
these are issues which will be the subject of discussion in the next section as
well. First, the decision in Adomako, though stating that recldessness was not
the required standard, allowed the use of the term "reckless" i decisions"in its
ordinary meaning as part ofhis exposition ofthe law ifhe deem)' it appropriate in
the circumstances ofthe particular case. '''''The scope of confusion this statement
has caused will become clearer when we consider the law of criminal negligence
in India in the next section. Second, the application of the principles of criminal
negligence to medical professionals across the public-private dichoromy has led
to interesting policy questions being raised. Again, this will become clearer as
we undertake an analysis of the Indian legal position on this aspect.

THE LAW OF CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IN INDIA
Supreme Court Cases and Statutory Framework
The evolution of the law of criminal negligence as applied to the medical
fraterniry has been relatively short and recent in India. Prior to the recent major
78
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decisions, the issue did not attract much controversy as applied to medical
practitioners. Further, because of the penal statute being clear in its wording,
it was not an issue which attracted much attention. Most of the major cases
which have been delivered on this topic are of recent vintage, and the law can
be considered to be unsettled and in a flux as of now. The present section will
highlight the major issue of theoretical confusion which has plagued the courtS
in India, namely the difference between the concepts of gross negligence and
recklessness. The development of the law in this regard has attempted to borrow
heavily from the decisions in the United Kingdom. What becomes apparent,
however, is that the law, as is borrowed, is not correctly taken and applied,
with results which have been disastrous for India. The court's policymalcing
and skewed reasoning will also come to light in the present section, with the
final part dealing with an attempted re-look originating at the Supreme Court
but yet to become binding law.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Suresh Guptd'° refers to
the test laid down in the case of R. v. Adomako.81 The case involved death caused
in the course of a minor surgery to remove a nasal deformiry. The incision
made in the nasal cavity had to be supplemented with a surgical device which
would ensure that the blood flow did not enter the tracheal tube. The doctors
attached the device in a manner that did allow blood to enter, with the patient
dying due to asphyxiation while under the influence of anesthesia. At first blush,
the test is correctly taken from the judgment: that of wanton indifference to
the life of a patient so as to amount to a crime against the state. However, rhe
Supreme Court goes on in the vein, without citing additional authorities in
the meantime, to a position where intent would be required to constitute the
offence of criminal negligence"

80
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What a perusal ofAdomakowould reveal is that the test in the United Kingdom
falls short of recklessness. The House of Lords decision clearly delineated
the law and went over the development of the legal position in detail. The
Court held that the application of recklessness" was conce ived in the case of
manslaughter in motor vehicle accidents, and the test of gtoSS negligence"
would hold the field in the case of medical negligence. It must also be pointed
out that the requirement of the presence of intention was a contention made
by the defendant, and it was rejected by the Court. It has been argued that the
distinction laid down in the case is a sufficient marker of difference between
criminal and civil liability. However, there does remain a degree of uncertainty
in the UK context with summations given to juries in different cases."
The decision of the Supreme Court was doubted on its soundness and referred to
a three-judge Bench in Jacob Mathew86 The present case involved what appears
to be a clear case of great negligence on the part of the treating hospital. The
patient in the present case was admitted to the hospital and was undergoing
treatment. On the night of his death, he had difficulty breathing and a doctor
was called. The defendant doctor arrived late to the patient's ward. He then
asked for a ventilator to be attached to the patient to help him breathe. The
oxygen cylinder which was used to ptovide artificial respiration to the deceased
83
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was later found to have been empty. In the time required to replace the same,
rhe padenr succumbed. The Court, in its trearmenr of the degree of negligence
which is required to constitute criminal liability, refers to the decision of the
House of Lords in R. v. Caldwell. The test in Caldwel for recklessness is devoid
of mens rea and is explicitly cited in the decision of AtUJmako as a permissible
use of "recklessness" as a substitute for gross negligence. The test of Andrews, as
well, does not denote any inrenrion or requiremenr thereof. It merely reiterates
the need of differenr standards in civil and criminal law, a difference which is
captured by the usage of the qualifier "gross."
The inreresting aspect is that the Supreme Court quoted parts of Macaulay's
speech on the Indian Penal Code, (IPC) 1860,87 pertaining to the liability of
doctors and exceptions thereto:

"If A causes miscarriage to Z, not intending to cause Z's death,
nor thinking it likely that he shall cause Z's death, but so rashly or
negligently as to cause her death, A is guilty of culpable homicide
not voluntary, and will be liable to the punishment provided for the
causing of miscarriage, increased by imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years."88

I believe that the presenr exposition makes it clear that the requiremenr
for liability is not that of recklessness, but that of gross negligence, and the
distinction between the two must stand. The requirement that the negligence
be gross itself is not found in Section 304A. It stares,
87
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" ... Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished
with imprisonment ofeither description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both."
However, that interpretation has been read into the law on the basis of
distinguishing between civi l and criminal liability" To that extent, it is
supported in English law and general Criminal Law for the need to have
different levels of 'fault.'
It must also be realized, that the application of Section 304A IPC does not arise
merely in medical negligence cases bur also in other contexts, notably in motor
vehicle accidents. The differential criteria and application ofa special legislation
has been developed in the UK.90The same must be appreciated in India as well
with regard to the nature of ptofessional duties associated with the conduct
of doctors. Therefore, different categories may be validly applied in the two
cases, and the rationale would be the nature of duties being performed, if any.
Application of the Supreme Court's Decision by the High Courts
The decision of the Supreme Court in jacob Mathew has been applied by High
CourtS to different cases. The highly objective nature of the tests and di= in the
judgment has also given way to the same being applied in many cases without
a proper Contextualization of the facts at hand and, therefore, led to manifest
injustice. Though there have been clarifications by the Supreme Court in later

89
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judgments," the same have not been applied. The decisions will demonstrate
that the tests adopted by the Supreme Court, which are incorrect in themselves,
have further been erroneously applied by High CourtS. It becomes clear that the
Courts have attempted ro identifY mens rea in cases of negligence in a form which
is incompatible with negligence law itself. The same has led ro a high number
of acquittals even when the facts have been quite clear in the contrary direction.
In the present section, I will attempt ro go through some of the judgments of
various High Courts which have sought to apply the Supreme Court decisions
at stages of appeal and under their inherent powers jurisdiction under Section
482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973." The High Court of Rajasthan held a
doctor who had wrongfully administered drugs used for caesarean deliveries to a
case of normal delivery, and had not acted in a satisfactory manner to stop profuse
bleeding post delivery, as not liable in criminal law and quashed proceedings."
In another case, the failure of a doctor to attend to the patient who repeatedly
complained of pain after surgery, where evidence of internal bleeding had been
seen, and where other doctors requested his presence, was not criminally liable
for the death as his presence could not have assured the survival of the deceased. 94
Proceedings were, therefore, quashed. In another case, criminal proceedings
were quashed on the ground that the accused doctor had not intended to cause
death and did not have knowledge that treatment would cause death. Associated
reasons were also the delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR) and the
allegation that a compromise had been sought by the complainant."
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intent to kill or knowledge of poss ibility {hat the patient would die or suffer an injury
(hat would lead to death were absent. This is a degree above recklessness as well and IS
Aawed reasoning. Even the Supreme Coun judgments which the case relies on do not lay
down such hign requiremems. Imemion and foresight arc not required under UK law.
See, JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL LAw AND ETHICS 104 (3,d ed., 2010).
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In a case of appeal, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that criminal
liability could be imposed because the deceased had to wait for the arrival of
a relative with monetaty funds before she was operated u on, and the delay
had complicated the illness.96 In another appellate case, the Gujarat High
Court disregarded material evidence and witness statements which showed
gross negligence to hold the accused not liable, as they had taken recourse to
all possible measures to revive the patient." The Court relies on an untenable
mixture of tests ranging from Bolam" to res ipsa loquitur, in a manner which
is nor legally permissible, to hold that the doctors were not liable criminally. It
also places reliance on the methods adopted by the doctors to revive the patient,
after the possible cause of death had occurred due to their acts, to hold them
nor liable for medical negligence.
In another case, the refusal and misbehavior of the doctor upon repeated requests
to treat the patient who was under his observation, and whose condition had
steadily worsened after the doctor had administered injections to him, was held
not to be criminal negligence. The Court held,

"The allegations of not attending the patient by the doctor, when he
was contacted by the aforesaid witnesses, and the alleged misbehavior
also do not foil within the purview of offence charged, to hold him
criminally liable. ,,.
The Court explicitly states that the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jacob
Mathew and Dr. Suresh Gupta provide authority for such a decision. This
decision rationalized that the ingredients of the charged 0 ence of negligent
manslaughter were different from the ones that were alleged.
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KatcherlaVenkata Sunil v. Dr. Vanguri Seshumamba and Others 2008 CriLJ 853.
State ofGujarat v. Bhupendrabhai Nandlabhai and Another, MANU/GJ/1 590/2007. The
patient was operated upon for nasal polyps, which normally is a 45-min ute procedure.
but the patient was kept in the operation theatre for about meee ho urs. Upon entry by
the patient's husband, he was informed of the patient's death due to card iac arrest. The

testimony of the nurse stating that the patient was having difficulty in breathing after an
endotracheal rube was insened was not considered.
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Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957J 2 All ER 118.
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State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dr. Ravinder Datyal20 10 C ri LJ 62.
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Medical Negligence as a Criminal Offence:
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Another case from Madhya Pradesh takes the resemblance to Jacob Mathew to
gory heights. The patient was suffering from chest pain and was put on artificial
ventilation, immediately after which, he became extremely restless. The doctors
on duty were either absent or came after some delay, and upon removing the
mask, the patient was declared dead. It was found that the oxygen cylinder was
empry. A POSt mortem was not conducted on the body of the deceased. The
doctors were nOt held criminally liable, as it was not their duty to check the
state of the cylinders. Their negligence, in being absent or not in attendance,
was held insufficient to constitute criminal negligence. 1oo
What becomes immediately apparent ftom these cases is that the law pertaining
to criminal liability of doctors has been perverted by the judgments and
misapplication which shows misunderstanding of the fundamental aspects of
the precedent which the Courts are bound by. There is little or no attempt to
apply principles of evidence or to reason the judgments of the Supreme Court.
Mechanical application of the perceived ratio of the Supreme Court decisions
has led to these judgments being delivered.

NEED FOR COHERENCE IN INDIA
The position oflaw in cases of criminal medical negligence, as has been highlighted
in the present paper, is not unanimous. Indeed, there have been several judgments
which do layout the correct position of the law. The misapplication has continued
and the precedents are rarely followed . The ptoblem must be analyzed at twO
levels as has been stated previously when judgments were discussed. Firstly, the
ptopriety of the quashing of criminal proceedings must be considered.
The scope and inherent power in the nature of revisionary jurisdiction of High
Courts is invoked many a time to ensure that criminal proceedings initiated
against a doctor are quashed. Indeed, the Supreme Court judgment, which is the
fountainhead of this line of cases, was also the exercise of revisionary jurisrliction.
In the recent judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of Iridium India Telecom

Ltd

v.

Motorola Inc., JOJ an appeal was preferred against the order of the Bombay

100 Stare of Madhya Pradesh v. Dr. Ramlakhan Singh and O thers 2010 Crill 1574.
101 AIR2011 SC20.
17 1
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High Court quashing criminal proceedings. In setting aside the order of the High
Court, it was observed that the complainant should be given the oppo rtuniry
to prove the averments made and a blanket quash would nor be legal ly valid.
In the decision of Raj Kapoor v. State l 02 it was observed by Justice Iyer,

"Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a
specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right
except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of
jurisdiction, but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart
for specific power under the same Code."
In the Iridium judgment itself, the Supreme Co urt went ahead ro state that the
power to quash a criminal proceeding would have to be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and in the rarest of rase cases. The Court cannot go
into an enquiry into the reliabiliry or genuineness of the allegations made.
In the specific context of cases dealing with medical negligence, it was held by a
two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in B.Jagdish andAnotherv. State ofAndhra
Pradesh, 103 that at the stage of quashing of an order of cognizance, an accused
would not be permitted to use the material which would be Ilsed in the defence
proceedings. The jurisdiction of the Courts would be limited co whether a case is
made out or nor, depending on the facts of each case. The High C oust of Allahabad
has also correctly followed the position oflaw in such a case, w ere the Magistrate
did not order the registration of an FIR. It was held that even at the pre-cognizance
stage, as at the revision stage, appreciation of facts was not to be done, and the
Magistrate was bound to act. On this ground, the revision petil·ion was allowed. 104
On the aspect of appeal, there has been a corrective step taken by the Supreme
Court WS It is not incorrect to State that Justice Sinha has taken the lead in the

102 (I980) I SCC 43.
103 (2009) I SCC 681.Per Justice S.B. Sinha.
104 Mangalsen v. State (2009) 3 ACR 2788.
105 Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and Others AlR 2010 SC 1162. The
aUlhor had the opportunity [0 work under Justice S.B. Sinha when the case in poine was
being heard by the Supreme Court.
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reform of the judicial line of reasoning in criminal negligence cases and was deeply
concerned by the facts of the present case and the ruling of the H igh Court of
Calcutta. It must be noted that the Court has arrempted to change the position of
law from a requirement of recklessness to merely gtoSS negligence in order to impute
criminal liability on the doctors involved in such conduct. Justice Sinha states:

"A negligence which is not o/such a high degree may provide a ground
for action in civil low but cannot form the basis for prosecution. To
prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal low, it
must be shown that the accused did something orfoiled to M something
which, in the given focts and circumstances, no medical professional in
his ordinary senses and prudence would have Mne or foiled to do. " 106
Another norable feature of the decision is the Court attempting to shift the
burden of proof as regards the exact method of treatment employed to the
hospital. It is stated that a hospital is in a much better position to disclose what
medicines were administered, and how the condition of the patient progressed,
than the complainant. 107 In the present case, this was motivated by the highly
complex nature of ailment and medication, and the allegations and denials that
had been made by the parties as regards the mode of diagnosis and treatment.
This position, when it is concretized by further decisions, will undoubtedly
lead to a situation where hospitals would be placed under an obligation to
maintain records and provide treatment as provided under law. This would
also mean that the discharge of corpses without post mortem being performed
would be a thing of the past.

As regards the actual criminal liability of the doctors involved in the present
case, the Supreme Court has stopped just one step short of imposing such
liability. This is so because of the nature of the case and the treatment given

106 Id. 204.
107 Id. 207. For a discussion on St3{U(Qry provisions providing for a shifting of burden,
see DR. S.V JOGA RAo, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MEDICAL LAw: A CRITICAL Focus 70
(I 999). The judgment of the Supreme Court in the present case is not novel. This was

also done in the ease of So vi,. Garg v. National Htart Instituu, (2004) 8 sec 56, where
the Supreme Court held that burden of proof would shift [Q [he hospital once evidence
had been adduced towards death due to negligence. This was also followed in Nizam

Institute of Medieal Sciences v. Prashant Dhananka and Others II (2009) ePj 61 (Se).
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to the deceased patient. The ultimate death of the patient was the result of the
negligence of more than one doctor, and it could not be said that the negligence
of one of them led to the resulting death. fu the Supreme Court states,
"In the imtant case, negligent action has been noticed with respect
to more than one respondent. A cumulative incidence, therefore,
has led to the death of the patient. It is to be noted that doctrine of
cumulative effoct is not available in criminal law. The complexities
involved in the instant case, as also differing nature of negligence
exercised by various actors, make it very difficult to distil individual
extent ofnegligence with respect to each ofthe respondents. In such a
scenario, finding of medical negligence under Section 304A cannot
be objectively determined. "108
On a further heartening note, the Supreme Court adversely notes and
expresses its "agony" on many of the observations made by the High Court of
Calcutta lO9 which were of the nature of exculpating the doctors from liability
and which were not at all supported by medical evidence. It is precisely this
form of substituted judgmeilt which has led several High Courts into error in
making their decisions in cases of criminal negligence. The Supreme Court's
observations would hopefully discourage such methods of analysis in the future.

CONCLUSION
The case of Sukumar Mukherjee, while holding that the defendants could not
be found criminally liable, terminated in the highest ever compensation to be

108 /d. at ~ 210. The Court further held, establiSh~'
n civil liability, "In view ofour discussions
mack hereinbefore, we au of the opinion that ()r the death of Auuradha, although Dr.
Mukherju, Dr. Hai<kr, Dr. Abani Roy Chow ury, AMR/, Dr. B. Prasad wm negligmt,
the extent thereofand kuping in vinv our oburvations made htrein before, it cannot be said
that they shouldbe held guilty for commission ofan o{fonce unda Sect ion 304A of the Indian
Pmal Code. We, fUrthermore in a case ofthis nature. do not intmd to exercise our discretionary
jurisdiction under Artick 136 of the Constitution of India having regard to the {act that a
judgmmt ofacquittal has been "corded by the Calcutta High Court. "The law of causation
in medical negligence cases is fraught with difficulties due to the fRctual complexity and.
to some extent. the indeterminate nature of medical science. See. Richard Goldberg,
Causation and D_{mw 325 in PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL LAw (3'" ed., eds. And rew Grubb,
Judith Laing

_tal, 2010).

109 Sukumar Mukherjee and BaidyanathHalder v. Malay Kumar Gangul y and Another2004(3)

CHN 187.
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awarded in India in a medical negligence case. I 10 This sum was determined upon
appeal from the quantification carried out by the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission to the Supreme Court. The earlier judgment given in
the same case by the Supreme Court has attempted to align our jurisprudence
with the correct reading of the English cases and, also, with what would make
greater sense for the coherence of criminal law as a field.
We have seen in the present paper that in order for criminal negligence to be
a viable offence, without criminal law relapsing into the use of absolute and
strict liability, the understanding of negligence as a concept distinct from
inadvertence is crucial. Equally crucial, but for other reasons, is the distinction
between recklessness and negligence of a gross nature. This difference depends
on the nature of the subjective mental element within the offence, whether it
is actual knowledge or a failure to perceive risk in a situation where the same
knowledge should have been present. With the help of examples provided, we
can see that this difference is important and that it has developed through twO
centuries of judicial development in the United Kingdom . It is this difference
which seems to have been conflated by the Supreme Court of India in Jacob
Mathew and, subsequently, has been followed by High Courrs with disastrous
consequences. The fact that High Courts have exercised Section 482 jurisdiction
in such cases highlights the ptoblem to a further degree.
The paper has argued for reconsideration of the standard which equates gross
negligence with recklessness. The attempt to do this in Sukumar Mukherjee is
on the correct fooring and proceeds with the correct application of the law
as it should be. However, Mathew continues to be binding precedent unless
overruled, which has not occurred till now. Taken in this light, Sukumar
Mukherjee can only be seen as highlighting the problems with the approach
adopted earlier, with no authority to overrule the same.

110 "Kolka" hospital, 3 doctors told to pay Rs. 5.96 erore for negligence: THE H,ND U,
Oct 25, 2013. Availabl, at http://www.thehindu.co m/news/nat io nallkolkata-hospital3 -docto rs-tol d -to- pay-rs- 596-cr-fo r-negl igencel art id e52 68364 .eee
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